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AbstrAct
The aim of this paper is to propose an interpretative key 
to Italy’s populist shift in a context of multipopulism. The 
authors try to analyze the main populist phenomena that 
have animated Italian politics as variants of the same 
schema whose point of commonality lies in a shared civil 
matrix. The hermeneutic thesis is based on the fact that 
the pattern of multipopulism in Italy has been determined 
by a succession of populist variants that have only one 
factor in common: belonging to civil society and, conse-
quently, a marked antipolitical inclination. This anti-politi-
cal mass attitude and the subsequent cases of populism 
are associated to the depoliticization process in Italy. By 
depoliticization the authors mean a set of changes in the 
ways political power is exercised in the neoliberal era by 
legitimizing actors less able to witness the presence of 
the “political”.
Keywords
Anti-Politics; Depoliticization; Italian Politics; Neoliberalism; 
Populism.
resumen
El objetivo de este artículo es proponer una clave in-
terpretativa del cambio populista de Italia en un con-
texto de multipopulismo. Los autores intentan analizar 
los principales fenómenos populistas que han animado 
a la política italiana como variantes del mismo esque-
ma, cuyo punto en común se encuentra en una matriz 
civil compartida. La tesis hermenéutica se basa en el 
hecho de que el patrón de multipopulismo en Italia ha 
sido determinado por una sucesión de variantes popu-
listas que tienen un solo factor en común: pertenecer a 
la sociedad civil y, en consecuencia, una marcada incli-
nación antipolítica. Esta actitud antipolítica de masas 
y los casos posteriores de populismo están asociados 
al proceso de despolitización en Italia. Por despolitiza-
ción, los autores se refieren a un conjunto de cambios 
en las formas en que se ejerce el poder político en la 
era neoliberal legitimando a los actores menos capaces 
de presenciar la presencia de lo “político”.
PAlAbrAs clAve
Anti política; Despolitización; Neoliberalismo; Política 
italiana; Populismo.
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1. IntroductIon
Populism is a component of contemporary democ-
racies, not only in the Western world but also globally. 
Carlos de La Torre has recently argued for a global 
populism that involves democracies in the North and 
the South, both the most stable and the less democ-
ratized (De La Torre 2018).This conviction permeates 
the entire contribution we are presenting here. It is the 
product of the crisis of liberal democracy, challenged by 
the dynamics of transnationalization of economic, politi-
cal and social processes that have contributed, along-
side the crisis of the old philosophies of history, to the 
weakening of national political institutions, reducing the 
capacity of state political classes to interpret the stratifi-
cation of interests in rapidly changing societies. 
In Italy this phenomenon is particularly striking but 
almost everywhere the political classes have identi-
fied a way out of the crisis by calling, sometimes even 
through specific measures (i.e. electoral laws), for a 
radical personalization of politics that, while on the 
one hand cannot be confused with populism, on the 
other is undoubtedly one of its major prerequisites. 
This is because there is no populist phenomenon that 
does not rely on the ability of a charismatic leader 
to convey, through specific rhetorical modalities, the 
populist message.
With this last statement we do not mean that pop-
ulism is reduced merely to a communicative modal-
ity or to a leader’s political style (Kazin 1995; Laclau 
2005; Panizza 2005). Rather, we believe that a pop-
ulist leader (micro dimension) could never succeed 
without the presence of a “populist movement” (meso 
dimension), which can take different forms, and of a 
“populist society” (macro dimension), thus receptive 
to the messages that tend to be anti-establishment. 
But while populism is not a mere rhetorical strategy, 
it is necessary to conceptualize it to understand the 
lens through which we observe the Italian case, 
which we have already defined as “multipopulist” in 
the title of this paper.
Scholars have not yet reached agreement on a 
shared definition (Mény and Surel 2001; 2002). The 
concept of populism is in fact vague and slippery 
(Taggart 2000) and in many respects chameleonic 
(Canovan 1981). There is a wide and complex debate 
on the theories of populism ranging from the theo-
ries of Gino Germani on populism and moderniza-
tion, through to Pippa Norris and Inglehart (Anselmi 
2017). This is why we distrust those who describe it 
as a sort of ideology, or even a thin ideology (Mudde 
2007) borrowing the expression that Freeden applied 
to nationalism (Freeden 2003).
If we accept the idea that by ideology we es-
sentially mean “Systems of explicit, integrated, and 
consistent beliefs necessary to justify the exercise 
of power, explain and judge historical events, iden-
tify what is good and what is bad in politics, define 
the relationship between the political and other fields 
of activity, and provide a guide to action” (McClosky 
1964: 362), or a “set of ethical principles that define 
the objectives, the organization and the boundaries 
of political life, offering an interpretation of the past, 
an explanation of the present and a vision of the fu-
ture” (Easton 1965: 290), we understand that every 
populist phenomenon shares only some aspects with 
ideologies, but not other fundamental characteristics. 
By accepting the definition of Edward Shils (1968), 
we can say that an ideology, to be such, needs the 
following aspects:
a) An explicit formulation; b) A high level of integra-
tion and systematicity; c) The claim of a difference 
compared to other belief systems; d) Some resist-
ance to innovation, therefore a certain dogmatism; e) 
Some imperativity with which obedience is demand-
ed; f) A strong emotional charge; g) A total consen-
sus; h) The authoritative character that its members 
give to its every proclamation; i) The strong connec-
tion to some form of collective organization (party, 
movement, group, etc.).
In this article, bearing in mind the existing multi-
plicity of theoretical approaches to the subject of pop-
ulism, each of which highlights a functional aspect of 
the phenomenon, we will use a minimum conception 
of populism (Anselmi 2017). Our idea is that populism 
is a specific configuration of political consensus that 
can take different forms depending on the context 
but have some common characteristics: the exist-
ence of a people’s community, a Manichaean com-
municative structure and a leadership that is directly 
linked to the people’s community. There is, however, 
a further characteristic that concerns contemporary 
neopopulisms. As Taguieff has already pointed out, 
contemporary neopopulisms have spread above all 
because of the profound change in the structures of 
politics, which have undergone strong media cover-
age and an accentuated spectacularization that has 
led to phenomena of personalization of politics and 
de-ideologization. The mediatization of public space 
and politics has produced an epoch-making disinter-
mediation between rulers and ruled, determining the 
populist configuration as the prevailing political op-
tion (Taguieff 2004; 2006).
In this regard, the Italian case is undoubtedly em-
blematic since there are in fact no parties that cannot 
be traced back to the category of populism. Since the 
first half of the ‘90s, with the collapse of the old party 
system due, above all, to corruption scandals (della 
Porta and Vannucci 1997; 1999), new actors have ap-
peared on the Italian political scene (primarily Forza 
Italia and Lega Nord), triggering a long populist sea-
son the influence of which on all the other movements 
and parties of the constitutional framework justifies our 
idea of the Italian situation as a multipopulist one.
In our paper we will focus on the three best known 
cases, the “ethnopopulism” of the Northern League, 
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the “telepopulism” of Forza Italia and the more recent 
“webpopulism” of the Five Star Movement, inserting 
them within the wider framework of de-politicization 
that we believe to be one of the processes that have 
most contributed to the weakening of the traditional 
political classes in Europe and in Italy. This justifies, 
on the one hand, a growing anti-political sentiment 
(macro-social dimension) in society and, on the oth-
er, the tendency of some actors to obtain consen-
sus through the construction of populist practices 
and strategies in politics. As we will see in the next 
two sections, when we talk about depoliticization 
we mean the transformations of public action and 
the dynamics of governance in the neoliberal era. 
In many respects, depoliticization and neoliberalism 
are two concepts that often overlap. Obviously, here 
we cannot support the thesis that populism is the 
consequence of depoliticization. It would be a false 
assumption, also because populism in its variants is 
an ancient phenomenon that historically precedes 
neoliberalism. We assert instead that the crisis of the 
classical ideologies, depoliticization (or neoliberal-
ism) and economic crisis (hence social malaise) to-
gether produce a mixture that intensifies the distance 
between civil society and political classes and the 
development of an anti-political sentiment on the part 
of society that is the fundamental social ingredient of 
every populist phenomenon.
Our attempt is thus to propose an interpretative key 
of the Italian shift to populism in a context of multi-
populism. We will therefore try to analyze the main 
populist phenomena that have animated Italian politics 
as variants of the same schema of which the point of 
commonality lies in the shared civic matrix. Our her-
meneutic thesis is in fact based on the fact that the 
pattern of multipopulism in Italy has been determined 
by a succession of populist variants that have only one 
factor in common: belonging to civil society and, con-
sequently, a marked antipolitical inclination.
2. dePolItIcIzAtIon As the 
PolItIcAl context of 
contemPorAry PoPulIsm 
When we talk about depoliticization, we are not 
referring to the various theories about depoliticiza-
tion on the part of society and citizens, described 
in terms of individualization and atomization. In this 
paper, by depoliticization we mean a set of changes 
in the ways political power is exercised in the neolib-
eral era (Burnham 2001; 2017; de Nardis 2017), by 
legitimizing actors less able to witness the presence 
of the “political”. Nowadays, representative politics 
appears less responsible for the choices, with the re-
lated costs and failures that influence the regulation 
of society, since economic and cultural processes 
acquire the characteristics of necessity or “inevita-
bility”. Depoliticization is affirmed in various ways. In 
particular, in the European context, we can observe 
a “governmental”, a “discursive” and a “social” depo-
liticization (Hay 2007).
Governmental de-politicization itself has various 
faces that mainly concern the polity aspect (Jessop 
2014) and the relationships between government and 
governance. It consists of shifts in decision-making 
from elective arenas and offices to settings presented 
as neutral and objective because they are distant from 
institutional politics (Flinders 2008): central banks, 
independent regulatory authorities, various agencies 
(Burnham 1999; Hay 2007; Kettel 2008), as well as 
public service companies that have been privatized 
and made dependent on the market and the interfer-
ence of politicians and their short-term optics dictat-
ed by electoral rhythms (Flinders and Buller 2006a). 
These slippages define depoliticization as one of the 
effects of a meta-governance which re-regulates gov-
ernance (Jessop 2011; Fawcett and Marsh 2014).
Another power shift, implemented through deci-
sions by governments and national parliaments, ben-
efits actors of a higher and non-elective scale, such 
as strong (intergovernmental) bodies and European 
Union procedures (i.e. Fiscal Compact) and pro-
duces various forms of compliance with international 
agreements and standards, whose enforcement is 
the task of technical agents and tools. Some exam-
ples: the obligation for EU governments to have pub-
lic finance decisions approved by the Commission 
in its dual technical and political capacity before 
presenting them to their parliaments (Cavatorto and 
Ferreri 2015); for other regions of the world, the con-
ditionalities of IMF and WB, the constraints coming 
from WTO agreements (Flinders and Buller 2006b) 
and its “courts”, as well as from other sources of legal 
regulation deriving from bi- or multi-lateral forms of 
international agreement, often implemented through 
expertise (Huggins 2015); the technocratic fine-tun-
ing and the imposition of good governance regula-
tory models on, among others, the countries of the 
Eastern-European transition; the sanctions indirectly 
imposed by rating agencies and operators of global 
financial speculation in relation to public finance poli-
cies. These shifts concentrate powers outside state 
politics and also urge a de-empowerment of the po-
litical actors affected by them (Burnham 2001; Kettel 
2008;Wood and Flinders 2014).
Another side of the phenomenon is the adoption of 
meta-decisions that make it impossible to take other 
decisions later, tying the hands of decision makers 
(Flinders and Buller 2006a; 2006b). For example, 
constitutionalizing the budget balance obligation de-
politicizes national economic policies, whose task is 
reduced to monitoring and adjusting the route with 
measures that fall within pre-set standards.
The technicalization of political processes is another 
important part of depoliticization, with the assignment of 
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regulatory effects and allocation of resources to technol-
ogies such as evaluation, with its “primacy of numbers” 
or technical procedures to support political action that 
make the choices evidence-based and divorced from 
ideologies and social pressures, such as Regulatory 
Impact Analysis, mandatory in Italy for every law, or 
“data driven decision making”, based on the idea that 
those who make decisions in the public sphere cannot 
ignore the movements [data driven innovation] taking 
place in the commercial sector (Bove 2014).
The “technicians” become the protagonists, some-
times called on to perform functions of “depoliticized 
politics” directly, as in governments of national unity, 
legitimized in the name of emergencies and excep-
tionality, for which representation and consent have no 
relevance, while the professional skills and reliability of 
supra-national markets and institutions are important.
A discursive depoliticization results in the conver-
gence of preferences (Flinders and Buller 2006a) to-
wards a single cognitive construction of reality (frame 
for public actions). It is no coincidence that the pre-
vailing paradigm in the contemporary liberal political 
economy has been narrated in the form of “single 
thought” [there is no alternative], demonstrating the 
cultural hegemony of financial capitalism. Policies 
become inevitable responses without rational alter-
natives. Especially in Europe, the fading of program-
matic differences between the right and the left is a 
consequence and evidence of this type of depolitici-
zation. The convergence is aided by the communi-
cation of imaginaries and knowledge brands (Jessop 
2009; Sum and Jessop 2013) endowed with high 
valence, a sort of influence of pre-rational emotional 
states involving individuals, political decision-makers 
and epistemic communities on the acceptance or re-
fusal of an idea relating to a policy and seductiveness, 
i.e. a specific normative force, exercised by indicating 
what to aspire to. These are forms of communication 
and construction of meanings based on appeals or 
slogans (Wood 2015), which refer to (good) common 
sense imbued with moral or ethical values.
Consensus is mobilized around assumptions 
whose social acceptability cannot be questioned, 
thus legitimizing unquestionable paradigms. The pre-
vailing ones highlight various aspects of the primacy 
of regulation throughout the market. For example, 
everything is narrated as efficient, flexible, innova-
tive, smart. These lures can guide, legitimize and 
incentivize both public actions and individual and 
social behaviors, such as sustainable lifestyles and 
consumption patterns, which represent depoliticized 
responses to collective developmental challenges 
(Hay 2007). Conversely, this also is applied to what 
is unacceptable and subject to stigma: first and fore-
most, everything - debt, expenditure, administration, 
social conflict - is public.
With depoliticization the contradictions of regu-
lation are reduced to policy problems managed by 
experts and participatory processes with a prede-
fined outcome (Swyngedouw 2007; Wilson and 
Swyngedouw 2014). Actions are addressed through 
the construction of meaning horizons and the indica-
tion of collective goals in the form of “public truth” by 
non-political actors (Jessop 2014, 2011).
The governance season initiated at the same 
time as the orientation of public policies to the mar-
ket has seen the formal inclusion of companies in 
cooperative processes and public-private partner-
ships (Willems et al. 2017). These have produced 
both business-friendly regulations and isomorphism 
of depoliticized public action with the market and its 
actors. It is perceived above all by focusing on the 
local scale. The representation of cities as actors en-
dowed with a system of collective decision-making, 
common interests, mechanisms of integration, and 
capacity for innovation, translated operationally into 
the regulatory framework underlying the reforms of 
metropolitan governance, is shaped around the com-
pany model.
Companies, including “social” ones, in seeking and 
nurturing new markets and assuring them through re-
lations with local governments, try to guide collective 
action through a specific capacity for ideas. The pro-
business regulations aim at acquiring consensus and 
legitimacy by presenting themselves as capable of 
defining patented solutions through the market and 
technologies for collective problems (environment, 
quality of life, economic development, participation, 
mobility, social inclusion, etc.). These are placed 
within broader meaning systems, often designed by 
world-renowned gurus and processed in ITC trans-
national corporations, adapted to local retail markets 
and recognized and institutionalized by transnational 
and national policies. The sense of inevitability and 
naturalization of these technical solutions resides in 
their being manifestly rational and preferable to in-
effective models and sources of waste and malaise, 
both individual and collective.
The messages are transmitted through advertis-
ing and seductive representations of a desirable 
society (intelligent, sustainable, supportive, happy). 
The hegemonic functionality of these imaginaries is 
expressed in a preference-shaping in which the in-
terests of the business, or the organization of com-
munity action in the form of a company, allow the 
achievement of general environmental and social 
objectives. In this way, it is possible to bring back 
within the horizons of market sense the reformula-
tion of rights that in the past was the focus of con-
flicting demands in civil society. The frame tends to 
overlap and mutually reinforce that of the European 
scale: the issues are of collective interest, defined 
as factors of productivity, competitiveness and so-
cial cohesion, and resilience in crisis.
Reducing complexity through this win-win imagi-
nary forms an original mediation between general 
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and private interests, citizenship and profits. In this 
way, the depoliticization of government is fueled by 
new forms of politicization of market actors, who pre-
sent themselves as being also capable of solving so-
cial problems, or by making sure that those who want 
to face social problems take the form and culture of 
a market player. The companies are politicized, since 
they play a role that is not only complementary to pol-
itics, but also a substitute. For example, in the Smart 
City, companies do not only provide ways to establish 
how to deal with individual and collective needs, but 
also managerial models of strategic management to 
coordinate the optimization of local resources and 
the allocation of community funds.
3. dePolItIcIzAtIon And PoPulIsm 
In ItAly
With depoliticization, the space of politics and 
state intervention does not vanish. However, govern-
ment processes become less transparent (Burnham 
2017; Foster et al. 2014) and, at the same time, more 
rapid and less expensive for the elites. If science 
or technology say that there are no alternatives, it 
makes no sense to negotiate in parliaments with or-
ganized interests, so the variety of subjects removed 
from the risks of the assembly ballot and the elector-
al judgment grows. In the public sphere, this makes 
processes of depoliticization a matter of naturaliza-
tion, presented by many institutional actors as forms 
of rationalization that are partly inevitable and partly 
desirable (Hay 2007). This is especially so in times 
of crisis, since they are associated with the reduction 
of political conflict (between parties and coalitions) 
and social conflict (capacity for pressure and access 
to specific interests), factors that make public action 
slow and uncertain, something that is not well toler-
ated by the markets and their interests.
Eliminating or reducing the political character of 
actions or establishing a governance “in which po-
litical decisions are made without the impression of 
doing so” (de Leonardis 2013: 138) does not mean 
reducing regulatory needs, but rather producing them 
in new ways. In fact, the effects of the actions do not 
cease to be political, since they consist of the selec-
tive allocation of material and immaterial values. Just 
by considering these effects, we can hypothesize 
an answer to the question of why the contemporary 
forms of depoliticization have succeeded. It would be 
difficult to understand why this is a dominant model 
today, without relating it to the hegemony created by 
the economic elites through the system of values and 
beliefs of the neoliberal paradigm (Foster et al. 2014). 
Depoliticization is in fact the result of a coherent and 
functional meta-governance of a political strategy 
(Jessop 2014) and the market-oriented public ac-
tion that uses it as a specific institutional and discur-
sive resource that allows the shaping of strategies of 
wealth accumulation as a hegemonic political project 
(D’Albergo 2016; Moini 2015: 37; Moini 2016; Peck 
and Tickell 2002; Jessop 1997; Burnham 1999).
In Italy these dynamics have been widely analyzed 
with a focus on specific processes, with respect to 
the dynamics of welfare restructuring (Caselli 2016; 
D’Albergo and Moini 2017; D’Agostino 2017; Di Chio 
2017), privatization of policies (Colombo and Gargiulo 
2016; Ricotta 2016; Busso 2017), and also with a 
specific focus on urban policies (Iacovino 2016).
The process of depoliticization in Italy is in part as-
sociated with a populist turnaround connected to the 
transition from a political and social system based on 
a strong mediation between rulers and ruled – the so-
called First Republic (1945-1994) – to a very differ-
ent context – that of the so-called Second Republic 
(1994-present) – based on a drastic decrease of the 
intermediate bodies, on a marked weakening of the 
political parties, and on a weakening of the trade un-
ions and associations.
Immediately after the Second World War in Italy, a 
complex system of political and social representation 
was established, consisting of a strong partitocracy, 
very deep-rooted unions and a constellation of asso-
ciations of different ideological orientations. All of this 
characterized Italian society as a “political society” 
because it was strongly based on political mediation. 
With the turnaround of 1992 many of the social and 
political mediation devices lost their function, leaving 
a vacuum of representation, but at the same time lay-
ing the foundations for new forms of more direct, per-
sonalized, and populist representation (Urbinati and 
Ragazzoni 2016).
In the following sections, we will illustrate the char-
acteristics of the Italian populist change in terms of 
“multipopulism”, i.e. the coexistence of several popu-
list actors in a single country. Our attempt is to pro-
vide a single frame in order to explain the profound 
transformation of the Italian political system in recent 
decades: depoliticization and multipopulism seen as 
competing populisms. This is indeed the peculiar-
ity of the Italian system. While in most cases, from 
Peron in Argentina to Chavez in Venezuela, populist 
forces appear as the only subjects in a context where 
the other forces in opposition are not populist, in Italy 
we have witnessed the emergence of various popu-
list forces in competition: from Lega Nord, to Forza 
Italia, to MoVimento 5 Stelle through to the mid-popu-
list transformation of the Democratic Party under the 
leadership of Matteo Renzi.
4. from ethno-regIonAlIst to 
lePenIst-nAtIonAlIst PoPulIsm: 
the cAse of legA nord
The Lega Nord (Northern League) is a very spe-
cial case on the international panorama of populism, 
because it is perhaps the only movement that, in 
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Northern regions, up to 4% nationally, in the most diffi-
cult moments. The first striking electoral success took 
place at the 1992 general elections, which crowned 
the Lega Nord as the first party in Milan with 18% 
of the votes (Diamanti 1996). Subsequently its for-
tunes alternated, with moments of real electoral fail-
ure, as in 1994 when it stood in a coalition with Forza 
Italia which absorbed most of its electorate. In order 
to avoid a fatal loss of votes in favor of Berlusconi’s 
party, the Lega broke up the alliance, leading to the 
fall of the first Berlusconi government. Then in 1996 
it recovered many of the previously lost votes and re-
located around 8% of the votes. This experience led 
to a change of strategy in the movement consisting in 
the accentuation of the independentist themes to the 
detriment of the federalist ones, which on a symbolic 
level became a communicative campaign based on 
the theme of the “Padana Nation” and the secession 
from the government of Rome. At this stage, the sym-
bolic ceremonies recalling the legends of secession 
- such as the marches on the river Po - intensified. 
The aim was to reinvent the Padana tradition and 
consolidate an ethno-regionalist symbolic apparatus.
The period from 1996 to 1999 was marked by a 
drop in support. In 2000, in an attempt to mark a new 
phase on national level, the Lega became allied again 
with Forza Italia, obtaining a new electoral success 
that allowed it to return to a government coalition. In 
this period, the Lega program insisted on the issue of 
immigration, intercepting the national discontent that 
was beginning to grow in public opinion. 
This new phase of electoral expansion was to last 
until 2008. In this period the Lega acquired broad 
support among the popular classes. The Northern 
workers, now disengaged from the historical forces 
of the left, found in the Northern League the closest 
political referent because of its populist rhetoric.
During those years, the populist schema in the 
League began to prevail over the ethno-regionalist 
one, and an anti-establishment community sche-
ma developed within the movement, independent 
from the local, anti-meridionalist and anti-centralist 
themes. The Northern League rhetoric moved in the 
direction of a broad front whose polemical targets 
were Europe, globalization and above all the influx 
of migrants. The long experience in national govern-
ments was influential in this new approach, which 
would be decisive for the change introduced by the 
new leader Matteo Salvini in the following years.
The corruption scandals that involved Bossi and 
his family and a large part of the party’s leadership 
group in 2012 accelerated the change. The continua-
tion of the investigations led to Umberto Bossi’s res-
ignation as general secretary of the party and the rise 
to power of Matteo Salvini in December 2013, after 
the brief interlude of Roberto Maroni. Since the first 
days of his mandate Salvini has expressed a new line 
based on the national-populist values of the Front 
the space of about thirty years, has moved from an 
ethno-regionalist populist movement to a Lepenist 
right-wing one.
The birth of the Lega Nord at the end of the ‘80s was 
a novelty in the Italian political scene although, in the 
European context, it was part of the wave of populist 
forces in which we can count the political experience 
of Haider in Austria and the Front National of Jean 
Marie Le Pen in France (Mudde 2012). The first Lega 
Nord was characterized by a marked ethno-region-
alism, aimed at promoting the “Northern Question” 
in the Italian debate (Diamanti 1996; 2013). It came 
after the experience of the Autonomous Leagues and 
was able to interpret the growing resentment that the 
civil society living in the most industrialized regions 
of Italy began to express with the weakening of the 
traditional parties that, for decades, had played a role 
of mediation and political representation, such as the 
Christian Democrats, the Communist Party and the 
Socialist Party.
Umberto Bossi’s leadership was crucial. It deter-
mined the near disappearance of the other leagues 
and started a winning strategy for the whole North 
based on the promotion of an antistatalist ethno-
regionalism, polemically oriented against the central 
government, with a rhetoric that indicated the nation-
al government as the main cause of the social and 
economic crisis. The slogan “Roma ladrona!” (Rome 
thief!) was emblematic of this.
Bossi’s leadership style constituted a break with 
the widespread leadership style common through-
out the so-called First Republic. In fact, until then the 
politicians had resorted to a communicative register 
aimed at marking the difference between ruler and 
ruled, using a language often hardly comprehensible 
by the popular classes and aimed at emphasizing that 
they belonged to an elite. With Bossi a new language 
was imposed. This communicative style was simple, 
often using dialect and foul language. Bossi’s com-
munication strategy was therefore based on a form 
of direct identification between him and his political 
community, demonstrating the popular and regional 
nature of his movement (Dematteo 2011).
In this first phase, the Lega’s political aim was to 
create an interclassist Northern movement whose 
polemical objectives were immigration, the corruption 
of the Italian state, anti-centralism and anti-meridion-
alism. In line with the European neo-populisms of 
that period in Europe, the Lega Nord has succeeded 
in transforming a phenomenon of local protest into 
an identity-based political actor pitted against the ad-
versaries of the establishment and the partitocracy, 
which are held responsible for the general social and 
political crisis (Mény and Surel 2001; Taguieff 2004).
From an electoral performance point of view, the 
Lega Nord has had some ups and downs, with fluc-
tuations ranging from 8-10%, with peaks of 20% in 
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National of Marie Le Pen, where xenophobic and anti-
EU themes become central, while the independentist 
and federalist themes are almost completely attenu-
ated. Also on the symbolic level, opposition to Rome 
has been replaced by opposition to Brussels, with a 
view of promoting an alternative Europe of common 
people (Biorcio 2015). In a context of economic cri-
sis and general social malaise, this new course of 
the League has proved to be profitable. In fact, in the 
political elections of 2018 Salvini’s party achieved its 
historical maximum obtaining 17.62% of the vote and 
becoming a government party in an unprecedented 
alliance with the Five Star Movement.
5. the exPerIence of telePoPulIsm: 
the cAse of forzA ItAlIA
Silvio Berlusconi’s entry onto the scene in January 
1994 opened a new phase in the populist change of 
direction in the Italian political system. From an ana-
lytical point of view, Berlusconism as a political play-
er is indirectly linked to the Lega Nord experience. 
Obviously not in terms of real emulation, but Forza 
Italia can be considered the media variant on a na-
tional scale of the anti-political sentiment springing 
from the collapse of the old party system. The meth-
ods of gaining approval implemented by Berlusconi 
are largely a refinement and adaptation of the meth-
ods anticipated by Bossi and his movement a few 
years earlier, in a stylistic key, however, dominated 
by the novelty of the television register and corporate 
marketing applied to politics. Berlusconism can be 
considered the second phase of Italian populism in 
which the process of social disintermediation and the 
crisis of party politics has exploded strongly. Silvio 
Berlusconi’s “descent into the field” must be read in 
light of a unique and very rare structural aspect on 
the international scene: the fact that Silvio Berlusconi 
was a tycoon of the TV industry allowed him to de-
velop the first form of media populism in Italy (Poli 
2001; Biorcio 2015).
We think it may be useful to examine the electoral 
fortunes of Forza Italia. First of all, the victory with 
42.8 percent of the center-right coalition, called the 
Polo delle Libertà, based on an alliance between 
Forza Italia and the Lega Nord in the northern re-
gions. This first success marked the real turning point 
between the politics of the so-called First and Second 
Republics. The government experience lasted only 
eight months, when the Lega Nord, fearing a loss of 
consensus in favor of Forza Italia, abandoned the 
government and brought about its fall.
In 1996 the entire center-right coalition, led by 
Berlusconi, won 42%, losing the electoral battle with 
Romano Prodi’s center-left. The reaction to this de-
feat led to a restructuring of the party, and triggered a 
membership campaign and a new territorial organiza-
tion. The party-on-the-ground and the strengthening 
of membership became the new organizational chal-
lenge of Forza Italia. In spite of the real increase in 
bottom-up opportunities to participate, the top-down 
management and the almost monarchical leader-
ship of Silvio Berlusconi were strengthened in an 
increasingly charismatic and personalistic perspec-
tive. In those years the aim became admission to 
the European People’s Party, which was achieved 
in 2001. The rhetoric of the Liberal Revolution was 
supplanted by a new Christian and neo-conservative 
rhetoric. In 2000 there was a second pact between 
the Lega Nord and Berlusconi that led to victory in 
the 2001 elections, initiating a long government cycle 
that lasted until 2011. During this period the transition 
from Forza Italia to the Polo delle Libertà was decisive 
(2008), a formation that was born from the alliance 
with the post-fascist right of the National Alliance.
Berlusconi’s last years in power were marked by 
numerous judicial problems and scandals also of a 
sexual nature, which complicated government ac-
tion, especially because they occurred in conjunction 
with the escalation of the economic crisis (Campi and 
Varasano 2013). This led to the break with the leader 
of the National Alliance Gianfranco Fini who, in 2010, 
formed an autonomous parliamentary group, effec-
tively leaving the Polo delle Libertà and voting on a 
motion of no confidence with the opposition. In the 
following days Berlusconi resigned.
Since its beginning, Berlusconism has manifested 
itself as a telepopulism, in line with the famous defini-
tion of Taguieff (2004), that is to say, a political subjec-
tivity founded on a direct relationship between leader 
and people mainly based on the television medium. 
Indeed, the first public speech that announced the fa-
mous “descent into the field” by Silvio Berlusconi was 
a direct appeal to the Italian citizenry, with a vide-
otaped message aired simultaneously on his televi-
sion channels. Berlusconi presented himself to the 
public in a persuasive but artificial way. The goal was 
to put forward an image of himself as a subject com-
ing from civil society and not from politics, the im-
age of a foreigner to the sphere of politics. This direct 
communication system based on television broad-
casting was structured in the early months of the 
1994 election campaign, remaining active for more 
than twenty years. It consisted of an apparatus made 
of television programs, newscasts and famous per-
sonalities, clearly pro-Berlusconi. Not only was the 
campaign particularly intense in the electoral phase, 
but many of those television stars and known faces 
were recruited as candidates for parliament. From a 
content point of view, Berlusconi identified some con-
stant themes that led to characterize him as a break 
with the past in the traditional political landscape and 
an alternative element to the establishment of the first 
republic. In particular, his communication focused on 
proposing a new politics against the old politics domi-
nated by the ex-communists.
RIS  [online] 2018, 76 (4), e111. REVISTA INTERNACIONAL DE SOCIOLOGÍA. ISSN-L: 0034-9712 
https://doi.org/10.3989/ris.2018.76.4.18.006
8 . MANUEL ANSELMI Y FABIO DE NARDIS 
From an organizational point of view, Forza Italia 
appeared immediately with a completely new and al-
ternative configuration compared to the past. Not a 
party organized in a classical sense, with a vertical 
structure, made up of leader and local offices (party-in-
central-office), but rather a fluid movement, made up 
of groups of citizens who are active especially during 
electoral campaigns. Berlusconi, on a national scale, 
created a “light” or “personal party”, which seeks not 
to appear to be rooted in everyday life through any 
bureaucratic organization, but finds its strength by 
reiterating the image of the leader with highly public 
media events. Leader and movement are identified to 
the such an extent that, more than the symbol, it is the 
name and face of the leader that identifies the political 
force in communication campaigns and electoral lists 
(Calise 2010; Bordignon 2014). 
Berlusconi, for the first time in Italian history, resort-
ed to a massive use of advertising strategies and mar-
keting in politics, applying the logic of image position-
ing, symbolic presence, motivation of supporters typi-
cal of commercial strategies. This serves to embody a 
sort of “populism from above” (McCarthy 1995).
As the first national neopopulist, Berlusconism 
brought about a change in the balance of Italian polit-
ical forces, forcing a reconfiguration of the other par-
ties as well. In particular, the birth of a movement of 
liberal and centrist inspiration like that of Berlusconi 
has led to the transformation of the historical party 
of the extreme right - Movimento Sociale Italiano, of 
fascist inspiration, into a more moderate force that 
was Alleanza Nazionale, whose leader Gianfranco 
Fini had long been considered the possible succes-
sor of Berlusconi. Moreover, as we have already ex-
plained, Berlusconi’s party, in seeking alliance with 
the Lega Nord and letting it participate as a govern-
ment force, has induced a profound transformation of 
this movement, stimulating the transition from an eth-
no-regionalist scheme to a nationalistic one. Finally, if 
we consider the non-homogeneous alignment of the 
opposition, constituted by the Democratic Party (and 
previously by the Left Democrats) and other minor 
parties, it must be underlined that the presence of 
Berlusconi strongly influenced the action and pro-
grams of these actors who developed a strong anti-
Berlusconi rhetoric.
6. the trIumPh of webPoPulIsm: 
the cAse of movImento 5 stelle
The appearance of the MoVimento 5 Stelle (Five 
Star Movement) is a novelty on the Italian political 
scene, but also a qualitative novelty for the forms of 
populism known so far. The centrality of the web in 
the structuring of the movement and of the forms of 
political socialization of the activists is unique on the 
international scene (Corbetta 2013). Since its incep-
tion, scholars have spoken of web-populism - that is, 
a media populism built around the internet and social 
networks (Mazzoleni 2003).
Located specifically in the Italian populist shift, the 
M5S is the most sophisticated variant of Italian multi-
populism, as it was created in opposition to other forms 
of populism, and in opposition to the classical political 
system against which the previous neo-populisms were 
pitted. Nevertheless, the M5S shares some themes with 
other forms of populism: the aversion to party politics; 
an anti-establishment sentiment, which specifically ex-
presses itself in the rhetoric against the “caste”; the anti-
political exaltation of all that is civil society; a marked 
anti-Europeanism, against austerity and German domi-
nation. The M5S is one of the first movements that pro-
posed the abandonment of the Euro and the exit from 
the European Union (Biorcio 2015).
In studying the origin of this movement one cannot 
ignore the characteristics of its founder and leader: 
Beppe Grillo, a well-known television comedian who 
had left television due to his conflicts with the political 
class, and chosen to work in theaters. He began with 
a campaign show in which he was the “megaphone” 
of social and economic scandals hitherto not familiar 
to the public. Decisive for the birth of a real politi-
cal movement was the creation of the website, where 
Grillo found a way to spread his denunciations to 
the internet audience, but above all the meeting with 
Gianroberto Casaleggio, an expert in marketing and 
the internet, which led to an acceleration of media 
success through the social networks. In 2005, in par-
allel to the site, the Meet Up project was launched, 
inspired by the US electoral campaign carried out by 
Howard Dean. Meet Ups are discussion platforms, 
similar to a social network, capable of creating the-
matic groups. Throughout Italy there are various 
Meet Ups that replace the old party-on-the-ground 
locations. They became a useful instrument of po-
litical socialization for the activists, where local and 
national political and social issues were dealt with.
From this experience it is clear that the M5S is 
characterized by offering not so much an opportu-
nity for initial political socialization, but rather a new 
socialization involving many former activists from 
different camps, especially the supporters of the dis-
appointed center-right. In fact, the M5S succeeded, 
more than the parties on the left, to intercept the dis-
appointment of the center-right supporters.
But the strategy of the M5S was not just focused 
on media. In fact, some street events were crucial 
for the construction of the movement and, conse-
quently, for the media effect of these on a national 
scale, in particular the mobilizations of the so-called 
V-Day of 2007 and 2008 (‘Vaffa-Day’, that is ‘Fuck-
off-Day’ against the political class and the establish-
ment). Events of mobilization that among the activists 
strengthened the idea of the possibility of a national 
movement able to move at different levels and able to 
offer a real alternative.
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The democratic ideal of the Five Star Movement 
has been assimilated to that of the new social move-
ments of the Seventies and Eighties (Biorcio and 
Natale 2013) with their emphasis on direct democra-
cy and on leaving behind the organizational models of 
classical political parties. Opposition to political pro-
fessionalism and representative democracy is clearly 
expressed by the two leaders of the Movement:
We would like the parties to disappear radically, that 
there should be new rules of community and that at the 
end of this process the MoVimento (M5S) will no longer 
be necessary, because there are citizens. But how can 
a parliament exist without parties? There will be move-
ments, committees, all expressions of needs that come 
from the civil society (Casaleggio and Grillo 2013: 79).
The overt purpose is to eliminate all forms of me-
diation between politics and society. The empha-
sis on leaving behind the left/right dichotomy and 
any ideological discourse is also associated with 
the criticism of party politics. The internet and in-
formation technologies are presented as the solu-
tion, allowing free participation by citizens. The M5S 
does not provide venues for coordination and the 
only organizational areas are the local Meet Ups. 
In this way the decision-making node, that in actual 
fact is entrusted to the leader, remains unresolved. 
Beppe Grillo is also the owner of the movement’s 
logo and the blog. This produces some contradic-
tions. In the absence of formal structures, the role 
of coordination from the outset has been played by 
Beppe Grillo and the staff of Casaleggio&Company 
(which is a private company that edits Grillo’s Blog). 
Although the Movement formally assigns primary 
importance to direct participation, in addition to 
Grillo and Casaleggio, the parliamentary groups 
have a primary role. The FSM proposes going be-
yond representative politics but actually its actions 
are based on the centrality of parliamentarians.
Also on a programmatic level, the electoral di-
mension plays a pre-eminent role. Only the elected 
representatives in Parliament can take on the role 
of spokesperson and most of the actions of the mili-
tants are aimed at supporting the work of the elected 
representatives. In practice, the structure of the FSM 
is essentially configured as a top-down participa-
tion, a mixture of Bonapartism and direct democracy 
(Caruso 2015: 324). Populism is not the only dimen-
sion of the WSF. As often happens, the populist di-
mension resembles other party models such as the 
“personal party” and the “corporate party” since the 
modalities of member participation are set by a pri-
vate company (Casaleggio& Company). In this sense 
there are some elements in common between the 
FSM and Forza Italia, the party of Silvio Berlusconi. 
In this regard, Bordignon and Ceccarini (2013) com-
pare this model to the franchise, where a certain 
autonomy is guaranteed at the local level, but it is 
bound by criteria established by the ownership.
The M5S has grown rapidly in electoral events 
over the past decade. The regional elections of 2010, 
where they took a considerable 5% in Piedmont and 
7% in Lombardy, were decisive. In the local elections 
of 2012 the movement obtained important results, 
as in Parma where the new mayor Pizzarotti distin-
guished himself on the national level, but was soon 
in collision with Grillo, eventually leaving the move-
ment. In the national elections of 2013, coming after 
the end of the Berlusconi government and the “de-
politicized” experience of the Monti government, the 
M5S had its first big national success, reaching 25% 
of the votes, and recently, after the national elections 
of 2018 in which it became the biggest party in Italy 
with 32.66% of the votes cast, M5S is a ruling party in 
an anomalous alliance with Matteo Salvini’s Lega in 
its new guise as a right-wing Lepenist party.
As Biorcio pointed out, it is interesting to analyze 
the configuration of the so-called Grillo-people, iden-
tifying three types of voters: the “identified”, who feel 
part of the party; the “sympathizers” who support, 
but are not real activists; and finally the “occasional” 
ones, who choose to vote for the movement in pro-
test against the other parties (Biorcio 2015: 109).
The growth and institutionalization of the M5S has 
involved many organizational problems (de Nardis 
and Medici 2015), still unsolved today. Firstly, the 
private nature of the Internet platform, which has be-
come in fact the structure of the webpopulist party, has 
aroused numerous criticisms from detractors about 
the quality of democracy within the M5S. Secondly, 
the selection mechanisms for candidates have raised 
many doubts. The selection of candidates is in fact 
carried out through a voting system on the internet, 
where the candidacy is open to all citizens but the 
number of voters is very limited.
In this and in many other activities of the movement 
there is often the contradiction between the claims to 
a system of direct democracy and the difficulties in 
achieving it (Bordignon and Ceccarini 2013; Lanzone 
and Woods 2015). From the beginning, the M5S motto 
was “One is worth one”, which explains well the per-
spective of individualistic participation of the supporters, 
based on a plebiscitarian vision of democracy, for which 
popular sovereignty must be expressed by the people 
almost without intermediation, neither internal to the 
party, nor external. Nevertheless, many of the decisions 
are taken by the closed circle of Grillo and Casaleggio 
(and, after the death of Gianroberto, by his sons).
Also in the relationship between charismatic lead-
er and community of people, the M5S constitutes an 
original variant. In fact, Grillo often appears and inter-
venes to direct the action of the ruling groups or to re-
solve crises of an administrative and political nature, 
but his leadership does not coincide with the figure 
of a strong and charismatic man. Grillo’s charisma is 
rather expressed by an image of a mentor, older than 
the average of his supporters, who, with his frank-
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ness and courage to denounce, reaffirms the values 
of the movement and indicates the right direction. 
The experience of Grillo, as a comic founder of a 
political movement, recalled the previous French ex-
perience of Coluche, the Parisian comedian who, in 
the Eighties, decided to participate in the presiden-
tial elections, securing the support of famous intel-
lectuals and capturing percentages above 20% in 
surveys. Coluche gave up his candidacy, urging his 
supporters to vote for Mitterand, due to the numer-
ous tensions aroused, but especially after the killing 
of one of his close collaborators (which later turned 
out to be a crime of passion).
Another structural innovation represented by the 
M5S is the party-movement configuration. In fact, 
unlike the classic development from movement to 
institution, the M5S has so far maintained a hybrid 
structure, where many movement elements remain 
despite the experience of government and of parlia-
ment. This novel configuration is also possible due to 
the substitution of a rigid party organization and inter-
nal representation systems with a set-up based on a 
direct relationship between the base and the leader.
To date, the M5S is a phenomenon that also divides 
analysts, because, while on one hand it can be criti-
cized for the rigid vertical internal organization strongly 
dependent on the leader, on the other hand, it is judged 
by some as a postmodern form of democratic populism, 
according to the famous definition of Canovan (1981).
Considered as part of the whole scenario of Italian 
multipopulism, the M5S is undoubtedly the variant 
that better than any other expresses the schema of 
civil society as the sole matrix of the politician. It is 
also the form of neopopulism that is closest to certain 
characterizing factors such as interclassism, post-
ideological and postmaterialist system of values, and 
a community oriented against the establishment.
7. renzI And the InstItutIonAl 
PoPulIsm
Renzi’s leadership in the Democratic Party repre-
sents the last variant of the populist schema of which 
we are trying to give a unified interpretation in the 
reading of the Italian change of direction.
We are aware that in the panorama of the typolo-
gies of Italian multipopulism this is probably the least 
clearly populist. However, it is a typology that is ex-
plained in a functional way with respect to other exist-
ing and more markedly evident populisms. The Renzi 
option arrives as a populism from above, strongly 
linked both to the establishment of the Democratic 
Party and to the Italian financial economy. However, 
it has used a highly populist communication style to 
gain support, through direct, disintermediate proce-
dures, based on the person of the leader and in clear 
opposition to the communication modalities of the old 
party politics. The main characteristic of Renzi’s pop-
ulist style, which distinguished him from the others, is 
his strong institutionality. In this sense he anticipated 
the style of Emmanuel Macron in France.
Renzi, former president of the Province of Florence 
and then mayor of the city of Florence, is a profession-
al politician who, from a very early age, was a member 
of the Italian Popular Party (one of the parties born 
from the ashes of Christian Democracy) and finally of 
the Democratic Party. In 2010 he promoted a confer-
ence launching a renewal movement of the elite of his 
party, summarized by the catchword “scrapping”.
Renzi’s movement achieved great national reso-
nance because it was based on two aspects: the 
emphasis on novelty (the old/new cleavage) and a 
clever political marketing strategy.
On the one hand, Renzi presented himself as a 
catalyst leader of innovative energies, proposing 
himself as attentive to the needs of modernization of 
the economy, of the state bureaucracy and of social 
communication. Being only forty, Renzi challenged 
the establishment of his own party and most of Italian 
politics, characterized by the presence of elderly and 
long-term politicians. On the other hand, he has pur-
sued a skillful strategy that we could call “in & out”, 
consisting of the ambiguity of being a historical mem-
ber of the PD, but at the same time acting in the eyes 
of the public as a wrecker, external to his party.
Moreover, the great media skills, the highly person-
alized style, in which some analysts have recognized 
some typical elements of Berlusconism, allowed 
Renzi to become a national public figure in a short 
time. He is a leader with marked populist traits, but 
with a strong institutional anchorage tied to European 
and international elites.
In 2012, the nomination for the primaries to elect 
the center-left coalition leader, against Bersani and 
other minor figures, saw the mobilization of numer-
ous people both inside and outside the party. Renzi 
did not win, but collected a substantial 39.1% of sup-
port against Bersani’s 60.9%. It was an important de-
but, after which Renzi’s faction became the strong-
est one of the Democratic Party. At the subsequent 
primaries of 2013 for the election of the Democratic 
Party secretary, Renzi won with 67.5% of the votes.
Renzi proposed his idea of a light party with a strong 
leadership. The enthusiastic phase of Renzi’s first pe-
riod was accompanied immediately by a marked pro-
gressive decline in membership, fully in line with the 
transformation into a light party desired by the leader. 
In February 2014, Renzi approved the immediate re-
placement of Prime Minister Enrico Letta, who had 
succeeded Bersani, after the latter had been unable 
to form the government. The success in the European 
elections in 2014, where the PD reached 40.8%, con-
secrated Renzi, who repeatedly flaunted this result as 
an indicator of his personal political approval rating.
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Renzi’s government action was in fact character-
ized by many reforms in different spheres, but they 
indicated a neoliberal and leaderistic approach, fre-
quently resorting to votes of confidence and person-
alizing every single issue. Several of these reforms 
aroused a very strong social reaction, such as the 
Jobs Act, which in fact profoundly changed the status 
of workers, a cornerstone of the Italian left, and the 
reform of secondary education called “Good School”, 
in response to which there was a major mobilization 
of teachers and students.
However, the reform, whose failure enshrined 
the end of Renzi’s government experience, was the 
constitutional reform that was to be confirmed with 
the referendum of 4 December, 2016. Renzi lost that 
electoral appointment taking 40.88% against a No-
vote of 59.12%. His immediate resignation as head of 
the government decreed the beginning of his decline.
Compared to other forms of populism, Renzi’s is 
a reaction to the spread of the anti-establishment 
neopopulisms of the Lega Nord and the M5S, and 
also against the populism of Berlusconi, from which 
however it borrows many stylistic features, being an 
institutional populism, that is, from above.
8. conclusIons
In this article we have tried to give a unified key to 
interpreting a series of phenomena that have charac-
terized the Italian political system in the last twenty-
five years.
The uniqueness of the Italian case is given by two 
determining characteristics: 1) a strong process of 
depoliticization that has led to the profound transfor-
mation of the structures and political grammar of the 
Italian political system, thus determining the transi-
tion from the First Republic to the Second Republic; 
2) the condition of multipopulism consisting of the co-
existence of several competing populisms.
The strong connection between depoliticization and 
populism in Italy shows how the organizational structure 
of neoliberal governance produces an inevitable weak-
ening of representative institutions in favor of a different 
mode of government in which the decision-making pro-
cess is verticalised. This favors the growth of distance 
between civil society and politics and the development 
of a strong anti-political sentiment that tends to be re-
politicized by populist leaders and movements.
We have presented the development of the differ-
ent cases of populism in order to demonstrate that 
populism in Italy is a multi-variant schema, from the 
Northern League’s ethno-regionalism to Berlusconi’s 
telepopulism, to the M5S webpopulism and Renzi’s 
institutional populism, finally closing with the nation-
alist and Lepenist populism of the current League.
Despite the clear differences, it is possible to high-
light at least two specific traits of this schema. 
A deconstruction of politics. The concomitance of 
the action of depoliticization and multipopulism has 
led to the deconstruction of classical politics, based 
on highly structured political organizations and very 
strong mediation mechanisms. The action of the Italian 
neopopulists examined shows in fact very fluid ways 
of operating, strongly disengaged from rigid forms of 
organization, but precisely because of this, liable to 
reconfiguration based on the people-leader schema.
The overturning of civil society. First, we refer to 
forms of neopopulism that are generated within the 
model of civil society in opposition to political society. 
Bossi, Berlusconi, Grillo, Renzi say they are promot-
ers of a new and alternative movement against the 
political class and the establishment. The populist 
shift and multipopulism were possible thanks to the 
centrality of civil society, which is no longer an al-
ternative to political society as in the First Republic 
(Farneti 1971), but a civil society that tends to replace 
political society, playing a prominent political role. 
Populist movements are united by a propensity 
for participation that is configured as “participatory 
upscaling”, a phenomenon that in Italy is evident 
above all in the case of the Five Star Movement. This 
is not just an Italian characteristic. The fact is that 
in Europe, since the 1990s, a significant number of 
parties have strengthened their formal openness to 
membership, also identifying apparently democratic 
decision-making mechanisms, but in reality, along-
side an alleged opening towards the activists, there 
has been a gradual marginalization of membership 
and middle-level elite (or party-in-central-office) al-
lowing a strengthening of leadership towards the 
control mechanisms traditionally guaranteed by party 
bureaucracy (Ignazi 2004). 
In Italy this aspect, initially evident above all in Forza 
Italia, is present today in almost all parties. The popu-
list aspect is combined with other elements that shape 
the party models considered. In this way, the League 
is a populist party that, especially in northern regions, 
has levels of organization and rooting similar to the old 
mass party; Forza Italia is a populist party with typical 
elements of personal parties or company parties; the 
Democratic party during Renzi’s leadership presents 
the features of the populist party with a strong personal-
istic calling; The FSM is a populist party, but with some 
features of the personal party and the company party.
The typical element that makes these parties suit-
able, or even functional, for de-politicized politics lies 
precisely in the sterilization of conflict, both between 
membership and leadership within the parties, and be-
tween society and politics outside party politics. The 
conflict becomes superstructural, also mediatized and 
spectacular, but in fact is not able to condition the de-
cision-making mechanisms. Monism, a-conflictualism, 
and technicality are fundamental aspects of contem-
porary populism or post-democracies.
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Despite the variegated nature of multipopulism, the 
Italian case exemplifies a political context with a low 
level of ideological pluralism. The various populisms 
differ in structural aspects that concern the way of 
producing political consensus but not in a different 
approach to ideas. The Manichaeanization of the po-
litical debate produces a reduction in the pluralism of 
positions to only two polarized opposites, greatly lim-
iting the possibility of expression and representation 
of intermediate and minority positions. Polarization 
predetermines political conflict, reducing the chance 
of having a real democratic dialectic, rich in positions 
and based on a productive conflict between the dif-
ferent sectors of society.
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